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STUDENT NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF BANKS v. STATE'
Defendant while walking along the road with a party of friends
fired into a moving railroad train and killed the brakeman who was
at his post of duty. It did not appear that defendant or any member
of the party was acquainted with any of the parties on the train or
that any specific malice was directed toward deceased. Defendant was
convicted of murder in the first degree. The court said, "One who
deliberately uses a deadly weapon in such reckless manner as to
evince a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief,
as is shown by firing into a moving railroad train upon which human
beings necessarily are, cannot shield himself from the consequences
of his acts by disclaiming malice."
The case is unusual only in that defendant is convicted of murder
instead of manslaughter, but it is not the writer's purpose to discuss
this question. It is an ancient and honorable rule of the criminal law
that there can be no crime without a criminal intent.2 It is also uni-
formly held that negligence may under certain circumstances suffice
for criminal intent.' Just what degree of negligence is necessary in
order to make a person criminally liable when no criminal intent is
shown presents a difficult question. Since it is generally held that in
regard to statutory crimes criminal intent is not a necessary element, 4
the problem of the degree of negligence necessary to supply the intent
of course does not arise. In crimes other than statutory ones the
majority rule is that the standard of negligence used in reference to
civil actions is not applicable to the criminal law. In other words,
the negligence necessary to impose criminal liability must be of a
different kind than is required to impose liability in a tort action.'
In describing negligence necessary to impose criminal liability, the
courts use the terms "gross negligence", "culpable negligence", "crim-
inal negligence", or a combination of these terms. Since these terms
185 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
2 Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889); Chisholm v. Doulton, 22
Q. B. D. 736 (1889); Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575
(1875); 1 Bishop Criminal Law (9th ed. 1930), p. 287.3 White v. State, 84 Ala. 421, 4 So. 598 (1888); People v. Falko-
vitch, 280 fl1. 321, 117 N. E. 398 (1917); Smith v. State, 126 Ind. 252,
115 N. E. 943 (1917); State v. Stentz, 33 Wash. 444, 74.Pac. 588 (1903).
'19 A. L. R. 133; Com. v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N. E. 249 (1910);
Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878); Dotson v. State, 62
Ala. 141, 34 Am. Rep. 2 (1878).
5People v. Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N. E. 575 (1919); State v.
McIver, 175 N. C. 761, 94 S. E. 682 (1917); State v. Clark, 196 Iowa
1134, 196 N. W. 82 (1923); People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N. E.
398 (1917); State v. Wright, 128 Me. 404, 148 AtI. 141 (1929).
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are used synonymously in the same opinions, it is obvious that prac-
tically the same meaning is attached to the three phrases. Just what
is meant by these phrases is difficult to tell. It is recognized today in
the law of torts that there is no basis for distinguishing betw3n gross
or culpable negligence and ordinary negligence as a mattzr of law.6
If the distinction is not necessary in the law of torts, it is difficult to
see why it should be made in the criminal law. It may b said that
the standard in crime and tort should be different because the objec-
tives are not the same; that the aim of the civil law is to make
reparation to the victim, while the aim of the criminal law is some-
thing different. This argument is sound if we proceed upon the
assumption that the aim of the criminal law is retribution end punish-
ment. If the objective is to mete out adequate punishment for given
offenses, it necessarily follows that the intent of the party at the time
of the offense is an important element. Once admitted that the intent
is the important element of the crime, it also follows that the intent
should not be inferred from ordinary negligent conduct, but only from
negligence amounting almost in fact to an actual intent to commit the
crime. But it is submitted that the primary aim of the criminal law
Is not to punish but to prevent and deter.7 Assuming this to be true
cannot we say that the civil law also is concerned with deterrence?
The frequent assessment of punitive damages clearly shows more
than a desire to make reparation to the victim. As a practical matter
the necessity of having to make reparation to the victim will neces-
sarily act as a deterrent to the offender. In so far as the civil law
Is concerned with deterrence it would seem that the objectives of the
criminal and civil law coincide. To the extent that the objectives of
the two are the same, the same standard of negligence necessary to
Impose liability should be used. It is not meant to infer that criminal
Intent is not important in the law of crimes. Moral ethics and the
criminal law must of necessity go hand in hand, but "our modern
objective tends more and more in the direction, not of awarding ade-
quate punishment for moral wrongdoing, but of protecting social and
public Interests. To the extent that this objective prevails, the mental
element requisite for criminality, if not altogether dispensed with, is
coming to mean not so much a mind bent on evil doing as an intent to
do that which unduly endangers social or public interests. '8 Evi-
dently proceeding upon this hypothesis many courts have held that no
greater degree of negligence is necessary to impose criminal liability
than civil liability. In State v. Hardie,' an Iowa case, defendant unin-
'Harper on Torts (1933), Sec. 74: "There appears, therefore to
be no legal difference between negligence and gross negligence except,
as Baron Rolfe observed in Wilson v. Brett (11 M. & W. 113, 152 Eng-
lish Reprint 737) the addition of a vituperative epithet."
7 Sayre, Mens Rea (1931), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, at 1019; Holmes,
The Common Law (181), 50-51.
'Sayre, supra, note 7, at 1017.
'47 Iowa 647, 29 Am. Rep. 496 (1378).
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tentionally killed a woman while endeavoring to frighten her with a
revolver. The revolver had been found in the road some five years
earlier and had repeatedly failed to fire when snapped. The defendant
was convicted of manslaughter. The court said, "If you find that the
death of the party was occasioned through recklessness or carelessness
of the defendant, then you should convict him. And by this I do not
mean that defendant is to be held to the highest degree of care and
prudence in handling a dangerous and deadly weapon, but only such
care as a reasonably prudent man should and ought to use under the
circumstances."
In State v. Tucker," a South Carolina case, defendant jokingly
told his infant brother he would shoot him and told him if he did not
believe him to hold out his hand. The boy held out his hand and
shortly afterwards the pistol fired, killing him. Defendant was con-
victed of manslaughter, the court saying, "A person who causes an
other's death by the negligent use of a pistol or gun is guilty of man
slaughter, unless the negligence is so wanton as to make the killing
murder." State v. Gifliam," another South Carolina case, lays down
the same test.
In State v. Becker,1" a Delaware case, defendant was indicted for
first degree murder. The defense was that the killing was accidental.
The court said, "If there be any negligence or want of proper care, the
loss of life or injury to the person cannot be said to be purely acci-
dental, but partly the consequence of the default of the individual
killing the other and therefore subjecting him to indictment for the
casualty".
Many courts reach the same result by an indirect method. They
hold that the negligence necessary to impose criminal liability must
be culpable, but they define culpable negligence as being only a lack
of due care under all the circumstances. In Kent v. State," an Okla-
homa case, defendant was indicted for murder. The defense was that
the killing was accidental. The court instructed the jury that de-
fendant was guilty of manslaughter if he was guilty of culpable negli-
gence at the time of the killing, and defined culpable negligence as
follows: "Culpable negligence is the want of that usual and ordinary
care and caution in the performances of an act usually and ordinarily
exercised by a person under similar circumstances."
A Wisconsin case14 is in line. Defendant was indicted for man-
slaughter for killing another by hitting him with his automobile. The
Wisconsin statute states that a person who causes the death of another
thru his culpable negligence is guilty of manslaughter in the fourth
degree. The court held that the defendant could be guilty of culpable
-"86 S. C. 211, 68 S. E. 523 (1910).
" 66 S. C. 423, 45 S. a. 6 (1903).
"14 Del. Reports 411, 33 Atl. 178 (1885).
"8 Okla. Cr. 188, 126 Pac. 1040 (1912).
14 Clemens v. State, 176 Wis. 289, 185 N. W. 209 (1921).
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negligence so as to satisfy the requirements of the statute, altho he
was not guilty of gross negligence; and he was convicted of man-
slaughter. Altho the decision reaches the right result, it is apparent
that this distinction between "gross" and "culpable" negligence is
purely artificial and without basis. This case indicates the confusion
which has arisen through the use of these terms.
In Nail v. State,z an Oklahoma case, defendant was indicted for
manslaughter for allowing his automobile to hit and kill the deceased.
The Oklahoma statute specifies that negligence sufficient to impose
criminal liability must be culpable. The court in defining culpable
negligence said that it is "the want of that usual and ordinary care and
caution in the performance of an act usually and ordinarily exercised
by a person under similar circumstances and conditions". Ample
authority can be found sustaining the correctness of this definition,
6
and it Is submitted that when the court instructs that negligence suffi-
cient to impose criminal liability must be culpable, and then defines
culpable negligence as a lack of due care under all the circumstances,
It Is In effect laying down the tort standard of negligence. This seems
the best method of procedure when a statute specifies that negligence
must be culpable in order to supply the intent necessary for a criminal
conviction. However, in the absence of a statute to this effect it would
seem that the only effect of the words "culpable", "gross", or "criminal
negligence" in the instruction is to confuse the jury.
There is no question but that the decision in the principal case of
Banks v. State T is correct and in line with the present tendency in
the criminal law of looking less to the intent with which an act is
committed and more to the consequences of that act.
BEaT COMas.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
"Criminal or culpable negligence, within the meaning of the law,
is the omission on the part of a person to do some act under given
circumstances which an ordinarily careful or prudent man would do
under like circumstances, or the doing of some act, under given cir-
cumstances, which an ordinarily careful, prudent man under like cir-
cumstances would not do, and by reason of which omission or action,
another person is endangered in life or bodily safety."'
In this case the owner of a small chili stand placed a gun on
33 Okla. Cr. 100, 242 Pac. 270 (1926).
282 Words and Phrases, p. 1780; Sikes v. Sheldon, 58 Iowa 744, 13
N. W. 53 (1882); State v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77, 47 Am. Rep. 92 (1883).
17 85 Tex. Crim. Rep. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919), cited note 1, supra.
IState v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S. W. 817, 37 A. L. R. 1094
(1924).
